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THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE: A POTENTIALLY
PREMATURE WRIT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Caitlin Boland Aarab
No. OP 14-0096
Montana Supreme Court
State of Montana, Petitioner v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court,
Teton County, the Hon. Robert Olson, District Judge, Respondent
Oral Argument: Monday, April 28, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. in the Strand
Union Building, Ballroom A on the campus of Montana State University,
Bozeman, Montana
I. JONATHAN M. KRAUSS FOR PETITIONER
Mr. Krauss began his argument by assuring the Court that this
petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control over the Ninth Judicial District
Court is not the State’s way of forcing the defendant to testify, in
contravention of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right. Rather, this
Writ is about enforcing the rules of evidence that apply to all parties,
including criminal defendants. Whatever evidence a defendant chooses
to offer in his defense must be admissible.
This opening led to an exchange between Mr. Krauss and Justice
Wheat. The point of admitting evidence, Justice Wheat noted, is to allow
opposing counsel to test that evidence by cross examination. In this case,
the defendant signed a Miranda waiver, voluntarily submitted to
questioning by the County Attorney and the investigator, and even
handed over a typed statement summarizing the defendant’s version of
events. Since that was so, Justice Wheat asked, didn’t the State have the
opportunity to cross examine the defendant on the statement he gave?
Mr. Krauss responded in the “past exonerative tense”1: “Well, questions
were asked.”2 Mr. Krauss then pivoted to policy: the point of the rules of
evidence is to admit only reliable evidence. The fact that an unsworn
statement was given voluntarily does not make it reliable. The
defendant’s statement includes hearsay, double hearsay, triple hearsay,
and victim character evidence; and the entire statement is offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. The rules of evidence should not be ignored
simply because the burden of proof in justifiable use of force cases now
rests with the State and not the defendant.3
1

John M. Broder, Familiar Fallback for Officials: ‘Mistakes Were Made’, N.Y. Times (Mar. 14,
2007) (available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/washington/ 14mistakes.html).
01:18:09
3
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–131 (2013).
2
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II. KENNETH R. OLSON FOR RESPONDENT
Mr. Olson began by assuring the Court that his position is far less
radical than Petitioner made it out to be. Mr. Olson did not argue that
criminal defendants should be allowed to rely on inadmissible evidence
in justifiable use of force cases. Rather, Mr. Olson argued that the
statement in question is actually admissible for two reasons: (1) the
statement contains genuine indicia of trustworthiness, and (2) the
statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. First, the
circumstances under which the statement was made support its
trustworthiness: the interview was conducted by the County Attorney
and the investigator, and they had the opportunity to take as long as they
wanted and ask as many questions as they wanted; the County Attorney
and the investigator praised the defendant for his honesty in his answers;
and the 9–1–1 recording, which is admissible, corroborates the
defendant’s version of events. Second, the statement contains a recitation
of all the “bad acts” the defendant knew the victim to have committed.
The evidence of victim “bad acts” didn’t need to be true in order for the
defendant to have justifiably relied on them when assessing what level of
force to use against the victim in self-defense. Thus, this evidence is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
In response to Mr. Olson’s first argument, Judge Holly Brown,
sitting by designation, distinguished the present case from prior case law:
in Montana case law dealing with hearsay exceptions, “circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness”4 are found in statements made in the heat
of the moment. In contrast, the statement at issue here was made after the
defendant had a motivation to lie. Judge Brown then read the text of
Montana Code Annotated Section 46–16–131 to counsel and the Court
and lingered on the phrase “when the defendant has offered evidence of
justifiable use of force.” Her point was to draw attention to the word
“evidence” in the statutes that came out of House Bill 228. The statute
may have shifted the burden of proof, but the requirement of admissible
evidence has not changed.
In response to Mr. Olson’s second argument, Justice Wheat asked
the million-dollar question: why is this our problem? Justice Wheat
asked Mr. Olson if evidence of the victim’s violent behavior could
possibly be introduced through another witness and not through the
defendant’s statement. Mr. Olson replied in the affirmative. Well then,
Justice Wheat suggested, why doesn’t this Court simply deny the Writ
and send this case back for trial so that a full evidentiary record can be
developed? After a considerable pause, Mr. Olson agreed that denying
the Writ and proceeding to trial might render this Writ moot. Then
4

Mont. R. Evid. 803(24).
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Justice Rice chimed in: “I think you hit it on the head earlier when you
described the problem we have here without a record explaining what
happened.”5 Buzzer. Time’s up.
III. PREDICTION
The Justices seemed persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the
defendant’s statement is not admissible and thus should not be admitted.
But toward the end of oral argument, Justice Wheat’s question about the
advisability of denying the Writ and allowing the case to proceed to trial
gained traction. This author predicts that the Court will deny the Writ
even though it is likely to side with Petitioners on the merits of the
evidentiary issue should this issue come back on appeal following trial.
Lower Court: Teton County Cause No. DC 12-009; Honorable Robert
Olson, District Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial District, Teton County.
Attorney for Petitioner: Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General,
State of Montana.
On behalf of Respondent, Attorney for Defendant Martin Vincent Lau:
Kenneth R. Olson, Olson Law Office, P.C., Great Falls, Montana.
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